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Gabhartv. Gabhart: An Indiana Response
to Corporate Freeze-outs
In 1968, the plaintiff in Gabhartv. Gabhar; and four individual defendants (his father, his two brothers and a non-relative), formed
Washington Nursing Center, Inc. for the purpose of operating a nursing

home in southern Indiana. Each party held one-fifth of the outstanding
shares in the corporation; each was a director, and the defendants were

also officers.

2
Within a brief period the relationship between the parties deteriorated.

Gabhart, the plaintiff, resigned in 1970, and defendants attempted to
purchase Gabhart's shares in the corporation but negotiations failed.

Thereafter, defendants used their majority voting power to merge the existing corporation into Washington Health Services, Inc.,3 a corporation

which they formed in technical compliance with Chapter Five4 of the
Indiana General Corporation Act., While defendants continued as
shareholders in the new corporation,6 plaintiff was reduced to the status
7

of creditor.

Plaintiff did not attend the shareholders meeting at which the vote was

taken for merger, nor did he avail himself of the statutory appraisal
rights provided for dissenting shareholders. 8 Instead, plaintiff brought
an action in federal district court which, inter alia, attacked the validity
of the "freeze-out" merger, claiming that its sole purpose was to deprive
him of his equity interest. The district court 9 granted defendants' motion
for summary judgment, holding that appraisal was plaintiff's exclusive
remedy. 10 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit viewed the case as presenting
Ind._, 370 N.E. 2d 345 (1977).
2Plaintiff claimed to have been denied access to corporate books and participation in the
corporate operation, which necessitated the filing of two successful stockholder's suits.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Gabhart v. Gabhart, No. 75-2090 (7th Cir. 1977). Defendants claimed the plaintiff's lawsuits undercut the ability of the corporation to secure
financing. Appellant's Appendix at 59-60, Gabhart v. Gabhart, No. 75-2090 (7th Cir. 1977)
(affidavit of corporation's president).
3Washington Health Services, Inc. was the statutorily designated "surviving corporation". IND. CODE §23-1-5-5(a(1) (1976).
'IND. CODE § 23-1-5-1 through § 23-1-5-8 (1976).
"IND.

CODE § 23-1-1-1 et seq. (1976).

6The defendants remained directors and officers of Washington Health Services, Inc.
After the merger, the name of Washington Health Services, Inc. was changed to that of
the merging corporation, Washington Nursing Center, Inc., whose existence had
"ceaseld]" under the merger statute. IND. CODE § 23-1-5-5(b) (1976).
'The plaintiff received interest bearing debentures for his shares. IND. CODE §
23-1-5-2(a)(3) provides that a shareholder's stock may be converted "into shares or other
securities or obligations of the surviving corporation or ... into cash ...."
'Under IND. CODE § 23-1-5-7 (1976), a shareholder entitled to vote in regards to a merger
may "object" and "demand" payment for the value of his shares. A judicial appraisal procedure is available if the value cannot be otherwise agreed upon.
9Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
10Gabhart v. Gabhart, No. 73-1632 (S. D. Ind. May 1, 1973) (order granting summary
judgment).
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"important questions of first impression under Indiana corporation
law"" and certified several questions to the Indiana Supreme Court. 2
3
One of the questions inquired into the validity of freezeout mergers.
The Supreme Court of Indiana decided that minority shareholders may
4
enjoin a merger that does not advance a corporate interest.
This note analyzes the Indiana Supreme Court's first encounter with a
freeze-out merger. 5 The analysis begins with a background to the general
freeze-out concept; then, Gabhart will be reviewed for the purpose of
clarifying the courts' view of the statutory dissolution process within the
freeze-out context and the purposes that would validate the freeze-out
merger. The analysis will conclude by delineating corporate transactions
that could be subject to the decision.
THE COURTS' RESPONSE TO FREEZE-OUTS
The "freeze-out"' 6 is well known to corporate law and has been defined
as the use of corporate control vested in the statutory majority of
shareholders or board of directors to eliminate minority shareholders or
reduce to insignificance their voting power or claims on corporate
assets.17 Freeze-outs take a variety of forms.' 8 For example: (1) majority
shareholders may sell corporate assets to themselves or other entities
which they control; (2) majority shareholders may dissolve the corporation and acquire the assets upon liquidation; (3) majority shareholders
may merge or consolidate the corporation under a plan unfavorable to
continued minority participation; (4) majority shareholders may drain
the corporation's earnings in the form of large salaries and bonuses, high
rent paid by the corporation for property leased from majority interests,
or large payments by the corporation under contracts between the corporation and majority interests. 9

"Gabhart v. Gabhart, No. 75-2090, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. March 8, 1977).
' 2There were three certified questions and all of them have been reprinted in the Gabhart
opinion. 370 N.E.2d at 351-52. The plaintiff had also filed a derivative action for corporate
waste and mismanagement. The court of appeals asked whether the plaintiff might maintain the action or, as defendants argued, the plaintiff was to be viewed as having lost
standing because the merger deprived him of his shareholder status. Without acknowledging contrary language in IND. CODE 23-1-5-5(e) (1976), the court stated that, as a general
rule, a freeze-out merger extinguishes a pending minority shareholder derivative action.
However, falling back on the equitable concepts of "clean hands" and "no wrong without a
remedy", the court excepted the situation where all other shareholders are alleged
wrongdoers. In such a case, the action survives. -Ind. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 356-58.
Gabhart obviously fits into the exception.
11370 N.E.2d at 351.
11370
N.E.2d at 356.
"5For an examination of other types of freeze-out cases, see Note, Remedies for Oppression in Close Corporationsin Indiana, 41 IND. L.J. 265 (1966).
"6Some courts use the term "squeeze-out".
' 7Gabhart v. Gabhart, -Ind.-, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977).
11370 N.E.2d at 353.
"9 See generally F. O'NEAL,

OPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

(1975).
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Courts have struggled with freeze-outs for many years, endeavoring to
fashion acceptable limits to the use of corporate control, but have often
reached inconsistent results.2 0 Pressure on courts to establish limits to
the power that attaches to corporate control has intensified in recent
years resulting
from the decision by many publicly held 'corporations to
"go private".2 1
Courts that have recently considered the Gabhart-type freeze-out have
generally adopted a "fairness ' 22 or "business purpose ' 23 standard to
2
1Compare Watkins v. National Bank of Lawrence, 51 Kan. 254, 32 P. 914 (1893), in
which majority shareholders were allowed to vote a corporation into liquidation against
the wishes and interests of minority shareholders, with Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight
Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904), in which majority shareholders were precluded from
using dissolution and sale to a new corporation as a freeze-out technique. An examination
of later cases reveals further inconsistency. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting
Stockholder'sAppraisal Righ4 77 HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1194-1200 (1964).
21
That is, to eliminate their public shareholders and return to a privately held status. The
"going private" fad developed in 1974 and 1975 when market prices for most publicly
traded shares were low. Procedures used to eliminate public shareholders include tender offers, reverse stock splits, and freeze-out mergers. See Brudney, A Note on "Going
Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Moore, Going Private: Techniques and Problems of
Eliminating the Public Shareholder, 1. J. CORP. L. 321 (1976). Reducing the number of
shareholders to less than 300 enables a corporation to deregister its shares under § 12(g)(4)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1976); additionally, the requirements of § 15(d)
are suspended as of the beginning of the first fiscal year in which the number of
shareholders is less than 300. Id. at § 78o(d). "Going private" enables the corporation to
free itself of the reporting requirements, the proxy rules, the inside trading rules, and other
provisions of the Exchange Act. Other justifications offered for "going private" include:
(1) the possibility of more prudent management in the absence of the pressures accompanying public ownership; (2) the savings of direct and indirect legal, accounting, and reporting costs incurred by a publicly held company; (3) the elimination of potential conflicts of
interests involving the allocation of resources, expenses, and corporate opportunities; (4)
lifting the morale of key employees whose stock options are worthless because of a declining market; and (5)preventing a cyclical stock market from placing a ceiling on the value of
the corporation should the controlling stockholders decide to sell. Borden, Going
Private-OldTort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987, 1002-20 (1974). For the
SEC response to the "going private" trend, see Note, SECRulemaking Authority and the
Protectionof Investors: A Comment on the Proposed "Going Private"Rules, 51 IND. L.J.
433 (1976). It is now evident that minority shareholders will generally be restricted to state
remedies if they are subjected to freeze-out transactions. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977). This will undoubtedly increase the significance of Gabhart.
22
See e.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. Ct. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
[Corporate officers and directors who engage in self-dealing transactions
have a heavy burden of showing that they have not violated their fiduciary
obligations to the minority stockholders. At a minimum their conduct is subject to a searching inquiry to determine whether it conforms to accepted concepts of fairness and equity. It may well be that the public stockholders of
Power/Mate would benefit from the purchase of their stock. If so, the question at issue is whether the price they are being offered for their interest in
Power/Mate is a fair and reasonable one.
Id.
at 49, 342 A.2d at 574.
23
See e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
In the absence of [a] business purpose [the surviving corporation] was purely
a sham party created to circumvent the rule of law that prohibits a majority
of stockholders of a corporation, absent any charter provision as to the contrary, to force the minority interests to surrender their stock holdings. Implicit in this holding [is] a construction of the Georgia statute that comports
with equity in good conscience.
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judge the validity of the transaction. Both standards are premised upon
fiduciary obligations courts deem owing by the majority to minority
shareholders.
In the recent case of Singer v. Magnavox, the' Supreme Court of
Delaware2 4 utilized both the fairness and business purpose standards. In
that case, the North American Phillips Corporation had formed a subsidiary to make a tender offer for all Magnavox Company shares. A
minority group of Magnavox shareholders rejected the tender offer but
were bought out in a subsequent merger of the corporations. The court
viewed freeze-out mergers as "an abuse of corporate process"25 and further stated:
This is not to say ...
that merely because the [c]ourt finds that a
...
merger was not made for the sole purpose of freezing out
minority shareholders, all relief must be denied ....
On the contrary, the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority
stockholders remains and proof of purpose...will not
necessarily discharge it. In such case the court will scrutinize
the circumstances for compliance with the ...
rule of "entire
fairness" and if it finds a violation thereof, will grant such
26
relief as equity may require.
Later, in Tanzen v. International General Industries, Inc.,27 the
Delaware court elaborated on the "purpose" which would validate a
freeze-out merger, by finding that elimination of minority shareholders
may be justified if it advances the bona fide business purpose of the ma28
jority shareholders.
2
In Gabhar 9 a unanimous Indiana Supreme Court declined to either
"embrace" or "ignore" the reasoning and views of such courts as Singer
and Tanzen which have faced the freeze-out question. 0 The court defined
its objective as balancing the need to protect the "interests and expectations" of minority shareholders with the need to allow the corporate
"flexibility" required by modern commerce. 1 Instead of basing its
analysis on the common law concept of fiduciary duty, the court looked
to the entire Indiana General Corporation Act.2 They found the Chapter
Five 33 merger provisions to have uncertain application in the freeze-out
Id at 570.

Del. Super. Ct.
"Id.at 980.
2_
5

-,

380 A.2d 969 (1977).

Del. Super. Ct. -' 379 A.2d 1121 (1977).
A.2d at 1124. In Tanzer,the court accepted a parent corporation's freeze-out of the
minority interest in a subsidiary corporation in order to facilitate the long term debt financing of the parent. The court found, however, that the transaction would still
have to
withstand examination under the "entire fairness" part of their test. Id at 1125.
29_ Ind. -, 370 N.E.2d 345 (1977).
20370 N.E.2d at 355.
27_

28379

"Id at 353-54.
32

IND. CODE § 23-1-1-1 et seq. (1976).
"Id §§ 23-1-5-1 through 23-1-5-8.
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context. Then, the court proceeded to consider the voluntary dissolution "
provisions of Chapter Seven,3 4 noting[They are] obviously indifferent to both minority interests
and corporate interests. If the statutory majority sees fit to
dissolve a profitable going concern in order to enhance their
own interests, they may do so without regardfor the corporation's best interests.The purpose of voluntary dissolution is to
permit the severance of relationships existing among
shareholders .... and if corporate suicide benefits all
shareholders alike, it is ... coincidence .... 36

The defendants in Gabharthad argued that the appraisal remedy provided under the merger provisions was intended to be exclusive. 6 But the
court found that because minority shareholders are provided no right of
appraisal in the event of voluntary dissolution, the "exclusivity" argument would be inapplicable under these statutory provisions and minority shareholders, who feel "improperly disadvantaged" or question "the
fairness" of a voluntary dissolution, may subject the liquidation and
distribution of corporate assets to "all principles of equity. '37 The court
then held:
[Tihat in a bona fide merger proceeding, a dissenting or nonvoting shareholder is limited to the [appraisal remedy]. But we
further hold that a proposed merger which has no valid purpose, which we construe to mean a purpose intended to advance a corporate interest, and which merger would eliminate
or reduce a minority shareholder's equity, may be challenged
as a de facto dissolution, by shareholders entitled to vote upon
the issue of dissolution. Such shareholders may enjoin the
merger.38
In other words, some mergers may beconstrued as dissolutions, thereby
extending to minority shareholders such remedies as are available under
"all principles of equity."
This holding presents at least two issues of interpretation. The court's
view of the dissolution process is unclear, as is the meaning of "a purpose
intended to advance a corporate interest." 9 The importance of Gabhart
lies in the resolution of these questions.
§§ 23-1-7-1 and 23-1-7-2.
31370 N.E.2d at 355.
36Id- at 353.
1Id at 355-56. This form of analysis would not be fruitful for other jurisdictions as long
as the transaction was in technical compliance with the merger provisions. For example,
Delaware views the various provisions of its general corporation law as having "independent legal significance"; a result prohibited by action attempted under one section of the
law may be entirely permissible when accomplished through the authorization of another.
E.g., Orzeck v. Englehart, 41 Del. Ch. 361, 195 A.2d 375 (1963). On the contrary, Indiana
has long read the provisions of its general corporation statute as a whole. Western
Machine Works v. Edwards Mach. & Tool Corp., 223 Ind. 655, 63 N.E.2d 535 (1945).
"8370 N.E.2d at 356.
3(Id

391&
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GABHART THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

Although a merger was directly in issue in Gabhar4 the case adds
judicial gloss to statutory dissolutions as well. The import of the court's
reference to voluntary dissolution as a means for majority shareholders
"to enhance their own interests ' 40 is not clear. Dissolution is a classic
freeze-out device.41 Majority shareholders may purchase the dissolving
corporation's assets, or adopt a liquidation plan which provides cash
dividends to minority shareholders and assets to themselves. 42 Thus,
Gabhart might be interpreted as encouraging a form of freeze-out
through dissolution. However, this seems unlikely because the court, for
the sake of minority shareholders, imposed "all principles of equity" on
the dissolution process. 43 Unfortunately, the court did not articulate
these "principles."
Some clarification however, can be found by looking to the case law of
other states. Other courts, exercising equitable powers, have reacted to
freeze-out dissolutions in three distinct ways. Some courts refuse to intervene, not even to the extent of requiring majority shareholders to purchase minority assets at going concern value, because a corporation
being dissolved and liquidated is not technically a going concern." Other
courts have provided affirmative relief to minority shareholders because
of fiduciary obligations which attach to majority status. 45 These courts
40See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
"In the 1904 case of Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904),
the Supreme Court of Washington said:
The practice is one which is frequently indulged in for the purpose of what is
described in vulgar phrase as "freezing out" small shareholders; a compliance
with the letter instead of the spirit of the statute; a pernicious practice, which
courts of equity cannot too promptly condemn. A dissolution of a corporation, within the contemplation of the law, is the death of the corporation. It
means a disintegration, a separation, a going out of business.
But in this case, all the elements of dissolution are wanting. The corporation, with a slightly different name, proceeded in the same town, with the
same property, the same powers, and substantially the same owners. All the
difference is about what was testified by the president of the corporationthat, after the new company was formed, the minority stockholder's interest
would be represented by a deposit in the bank instead of stock in the corporation.
1& 29-30, 74P. at 1006. See generally Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development in Intra-CorporateAbuse, 51 YALE L. J. 64 (1941). See also note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
42See e.g. Kritz v. Grossman, 463 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1971).
"1370 N.E.2d at 356.
"Under this view a minority shareholder would receive a proportionate part of the book
or liquidating value of the corporation, receiving no compensation for such items as goodwill. See e.g., Rossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 165 N.W. 254 (1917); Watkins
v. National Bank of Lawrence, 51 Kan. 254, 32 P. 914 (1893).
"5In Indiana, a fiduciary obligation runs from the directors and officers of a corporation
towards the corporation and each shareholder. See e.g., Hartung v. Architects HartungOdle/Burke, Inc., -Ind. App._, 301 N.E.2d 240 (1973). Indiana has not established
that a fiduciary duty runs from the majority shareholders to the minority shareholders;
however, it appears that a fiduciary obligation is recognized to exist between shareholders
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allow majority shareholders to distribute corporate assets in kind or sell
them at public auction and distribute cash. However, all shareholders
must be treated equally; the minority may not be eliminated against their
will.16 Other courts have not enjoined freeze-out dissolutions, but have
allowed minority shareholders to recover
their proportionate share of the
47
enterprise at its going concern value.
In a freeze-out dissolution, Gabhart appears not to limit a court to
granting minority shareholders only the book value or going concern
value of their interest. Book value would put minority shareholders in a
worse position than with a freeze-out merger, while statutory appraisal,
available with a merger, would merely assure the minority going concern
value.4 8 Accordingly, granting book value is inconsistent with the court's
concern for the minority's "interests and expectations. ' 49 Similarly
granting going concern value, which puts the minority in the same position as with a freeze-out merger, 0 is inconsistent with the court's state-

of a closely held corporation. See id. Directors and officers are precluded from using their
powers oppressively, W. Q. O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall. 108 Ind.App. 116,25 N.E.2d 656 (1940),
or from using the assets of a corporate entity for their personal gain, Cole Real Estate
Corp. v. People's Bank & Trust Co., - Ind. App. -, 310 N.E.2d 275, 279 (1974), or from
directly or indirectly deriving any personal profit or advantage by reason of their positions, or from utilizing their influence and advantage of office for any but the common interest, Tower Recreation, Inc. v. Beard, 141 Ind.App. 649, 231 N.E.2d 154 (1967). Accord
generally Leader Pub. Co. v. Grant Trust, etc. Co., 182 Ind. 651, 108 N.E. 121 (1915). It is
obvious that any of these established equitable concepts might be deemed violated in a
freeze-out dissolution. Moreover, even if Indiana law failed to recognize a fiduciary obligation owed by the majority interests to the minority, the existing law could effect freezeouts in closely held corporations where a fiduciary duty runs between the shareholders inter se and where many shareholders will also be officers and directors.
"See e.g., Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Ark. 1964);
Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.2d 93, 460 P.2d 464 (1969); Kauavaugh v.
Kauavaugh Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
"Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1942); Noe v. Roussel, - La. -, 310
So.2d 806 (1975).
"Under IND. CODE 23-1-5-7 (1976) a minority shareholder is entitled to the fair market
value of his interest at the effective date of the merger.
" . Ind. at
, 370 N.E.2d at 353,-54.
"0It has occasionally been suggested that statutory appraisal proceedings tend to produce overly conservative estimates of the value of the minority's interest. E.g., Vorenberg,
Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's AppraisalRigh 77 HARv. L. REV. 1189,
1202 (1964). If this was true, a minority shareholder might benefit from application of the
dissolution provisions in that a court would not have to estimate the value of his interest
within the confines of IND. CODE 23-1-5-7 (1976). However, Indiana courts do not view the
statutory appraisal provision as mandating overly conservative results. See General
Grain, Inc. v. Goodrich, 140 Ind. App. 100, 221 N.E.2d 696 (1966) which established the
following guideline for operating under the appraisal statute:
[D]ifferent elements of value, such as book value, liquidating value, stock
market value, evidence of sales in the market, the type of market available,
the condition of the issues financial, managerial, and past [,] ...
present, ...
[and] future possibilities and probabilities together with all other elements
which tend to affect the fair market value, for case, of course, are worthy of
consideration ....
Id at 110, 221 N.E.2d at 701. Compare Application of Delaware Racing Ass'n., 42 Del. Ch.
406, 213 A.2d 203 (1965).
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ment that more than form is at stake."' Thus, the logical conclusion is
that Gabhartpermits freeze-out dissolutions to be enjoined.
Gabhartprovides little other guidance regarding the court's view of the
voluntary dissolution process. 2 There is clearly no problem when a true
"suicide" of the corporation occurs, with all shareholders extracting their
investment to start afresh in other endeavors. There is also no problem if
essentially the same enterprise continues after dissolution, as long as all
shareholders are treated equally and minority shareholders are able to retain their interest in the ongoing enterprise. However, in other circumstances, when the transaction eliminates or reduces the minority
interest, a freeze-out minded majority proceeds under peril of indeterminate judicial intervention on behalf of minority shareholders.
Like the "principles of equity" statement, the court in Gabhartoffered
little insight into the meaning of the phrase "a purpose intended to advance a corporate interest. 53 They did provide an example of what is not
a "legitimate corporate purpose"5 4: when majority shareholders, also
serving as officers and directors, use a freeze-out merger as a shield
against minority shareholder derivative actions.5 In addition, the court
discussed, without expressly endorsing, the view of the Washington
Supreme Court in Matteson v. Ziebarth5 that an "uncooperative"
minority shareholder may be eliminated by freeze-out merger if this is
57
"the only salvation" for a near bankrupt corporation.
68
The court clearly did not adopt the Delaware view that the requisite
purpose can be that of the surviving corporation and the majority
shareholders. 59 However, it is difficult to theorize circumstances in which
the business of the merged corporation would necessitate elimination of

51370 N.E.2d at 356.
2

5 See note 86, infra, and accompanying text.
51See note 39, supra,and accompanying text.
4See
note 12, supra.
11370 N.E.2d at 357.
1140
Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
7
1 In Matteson the only chance for the stockholders of Ziebarth Corporation to recoup
their investment was through a merger or marketing arrangement with another corporation. Id at 302, 242 P.2d at 1035. A majority shareholder proposed an agreement with a
purchaser who would not buy less than all of Ziebarth's stock. Under the proposed agreement, the majority shareholder would also be employed by the purchaser. A minority
shareholder refused to go along with the agreement unless the majority shareholder would
submit to the "wholly improper proposal" of giving the minority shareholder twenty-five
percent of his earnings as an employee of the purchaser. Id at 305, 242 P.2d at 1036. The
minority shareholder was eliminated through a freeze-out merger to allow the purchase
agreement to be carried out.
"See note 28, supra, and accompanying text.
"This observation is based on the following Gabhart statement:
[Tihe policy favoring corporate flexibility is not furthered by permitting the
elimination of minority interests for the benefit of the majority, when no
benefit accrues to the corporation.
370 N.E.2d at 354. To assess the "corporate interest" from the view of the surviving corporation would, of course, merely measure the benefit of the transaction to the majority
shareholders.
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minority interests. For example, justifications for "going private" seem
as much for the benefit of the majority as that of the corporation.6 0 Cases
from other jurisdictions adopting versions of the corporate purpose rule
61
do not offer clear instruction.
Despite this ambiguity it is possible to find a measure of certainty by
looking to the underlying policy of the corporate purpose rule. For
credibility, any such policy must be derived by following the same ap62
proach used by the court - analysis of the corporate statutory scheme.
As noted by the court, 3 under the common law of Indiana, as well as
other jurisdictions, mergers and other fundamental corporate changes
were subject to unanimous shareholder approval.6 4 This rule reflected corporations of the time: small groups of active entrepreneurs, often family,
participating in localized, small-scale business operations. 65 It was ap-

propriate to treat shareholders like partners, requiring unanimous consent when an action exceeded that contemplated in the partnership agreement. 66 Because large amounts of new capital were needed to fund the
spread of industrialization, numerous dispersed and passive investors
were integrated into the corporate framework; it became impractical to
provide this new breed of stockholder with the attributes and power of a
partner.67 Consequently, the common law rule that a sale of all assets,
merger, consolidation, or dissolution of a profitable corporation required

unanimous shareholder approval was abolished by statute to enhance
corporate "flexibility." 6 State legislatures have continued to pay par"°See note 22, supra.
61For example, the trial court in Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., Inc., see note 23, supra, rejected the defendant's argument that the freeze-out of the plaintiff, a former employee,
was justified because the corporation had a policy of allowing only employees as
shareholders. The -trial court found the policy was not firmly established. However, it is
not clear whether the court would have found the reason acceptable if the policy had been
firmly established. See Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., Inc. 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (D.
Minn. 1972).
"The Indiana General Corporation Act, IND. CODE § 23-1-1-1 et seq. (1976), was originally
enacted in 1929. The Act drew extensively from the Uniform Business Corporations Act
(1927) and from the corporate law of the leading commercial states. Dix, The Indiana
General CorporationAct 5 IND. L. J. 107 (1929). There have been extensive amendments
and additions through the years. However, the basic structure of the original Act remains
intact.
"370 N.E.2d at 352.
64Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholder'sRights in Fundamental Changes, 23
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.307, 308-310, (1958).
651d
661d
6'See Gibson, How Fixed Are Shareholder'sRights, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 291
(1958).
"'See e.g., Schaffer v. General Grain, Inc., 133 Ind. App. 598, 182 N.E.2d 461 (1962):
The consequent power of a dissenting stockholder to obstruct and prevent
the merger of one corporate existence with another, under the economic
necessities of the advancing years, frequently proved a confusing and stifling
hand upon the corporate expansion, growth and industrial development with
the resulting disadvantage to other stockholders. To obviate this difficulty ...
Indiana ...
enacted ...
[the merger provisions of the General Corporation Act.]
133 Ind. App. at 611, 182 N.E.2d at 468. See also Lattin, The Minority Stockholder and
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ticular attention to the statutory merger provisions, steadily amending
them to further facilitate mergers.6 9
While the policy of flexibility prevailed over certain interests of the
minority, the new corporate statutes still contemplated fair treatment. 0
Fairness in this context seems to dictate two things: (1) that minority
shareholders are entitled to the same treatment as majority
shareholders, each receiving an interest in the ongoing corporation or the
same consideration per share for their interest; and (2) that the economic
value of what minority shareholders give up will be equal to what they
receive. 71 These factors are implicitly intergrated into the statutory
merger schemes. Because these schemes were designed for the merger of
independent entities, 72 separate managements would normally be
negotiating at arm's length. This, plus the availability of statutory appraisal, assures minority shareholders equality of treatment and exchange.73 Accordingly, the abrogation of common law minority rights has
been tolerated by the judiciary, and constitutional attacks, based on im74
pairment of contractual obligations, have failed.
The Gabhart-type merger is clearly outside statutory contemplation.
Majority shareholders assure the absence of bargaining by being

situated on both sides of the transactioil. With the statutory balance
upset, there is no inherent mechanism in the statutes safeguarding
minority shareholders from unfairness. 75 Because the Gabhart-type
Intra-Corporate Conflict, 17 IOWA L. REV. 313, 323-24; Note, Freezing Out Minority
Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1630-31 (1961).

69
For example, since 1969, cash, instruments of indebtedness, or securities, or any combination thereof, may be issued by the surviving corporation to the shareholders of the
merged corporation; there is no explicit requirement that shareholders of the merged corporation have a continuing equity interest in the surviving corporation. IND. CODE §
23-1-5-2(a)(3). This is not necessarily a legislative endorsement of freeze-outs. By allowing a
surviving corporation to pay some or all of the purchase price in cash, the surviving corporation can avoid severe dilution of its stock. Brundey, A Note on "Going Private'; 61
VA. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (1975).

I°See e.g., Dix, The IndianaGeneral CorporationAc4 5 IND. L. J. 107, 109 (1929).
"Greene, CorporateFreeze-out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 489

(1976).
72See e.g.,

SHORTEMEIER. INDIANA CORPORATION LAW,

100 (1952).

"See generally Greene, note 71 supra.
71Comment, CorporateFreeze-outsEffected by Merger: The Search forA Rule, 37 U. PITT
L. REV. 115, 117 (1975).

7'Even if he avails himself of appraisal, a minority shareholder will be precluded from
sharing in the continued growth and income of the merged corporation, forced to find a
subsequent equivalent investment, and will probably have to pay taxes as a result of the
forced exchange.
"This is especially true in the context of the type of corporation involved in Gabhart,i.e.,
a close corporation. Because close corporations are typified by a small number of
shareholders and substantial shareholder participation in the direction and operation of
the corporation, 1 F. O'NEAL. CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1971), there is less fit with
the policies that justify abandonment of the common law unanimity rule. See note 69,
supra, and accompanying text. It is commonly recognized that one special aspect of close
corporations is the opportunity afforded majority shareholders to oppress, disadvantage,
and freeze-out minority shareholders. E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., Mass. -, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). Assuming that corporate flexibility might in some cir-
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merger is not within the bounds of statutory contemplation, courts
should narrowly construe the Indiana Supreme Court's corporate purpose standard. 8 Only in exceptional cases, like Matteson v. Ziebarth,7
when a court is genuinely convinced that a freeze-out merger is "the only

salvation" for the merging corporation, should the corporate purpose
standard be deemed satisfied. Thus, the freeze-out merger would properly
serve as a safety valve, not a day-to-day tool in corporate affairs.
TRANSACTIONS AFFECTED BY GABHART

The scope of Gabhart is difficult to ascertain due to the broad and
general language in the opinion. 78 For example, Gabhart seems literally
applicable to mergers between independent corporations.7 9 However, this
ignores the fact that the element of bargaining was absent in Gabhart.
When independent corporations are involved, courts should warily enter-

tain minority claims of lost or reduced equity and lack of corporate purpose in the transaction because arm's length bargaining is probably in-

volved. No statutory policy would be served in the inevitable delay and
uncertainty such an expansive reading of Gabhart would entail.

The question of scope is also raised within the context of the short-form
merger. Although a "short-form" 8 0 merger was not at issue in Gabhart;

the court's language 81 could be utilized to support an argument that this
type of merger must be justified as advancing a corporate purpose.2
However, since this statutory provision expressly contemplates a parent
corporations' summary elimination of a subsidiary's minority

shareholders, a context in which bargaining could not 3be expected, it
seems the Gabhartrationale would have no application.
On the other hand, the Gabhartrationale may apply in those situations
where appraisal rights are denied minority shareholders of corporations

cumstances require majority freeze-out power, it would seem particularly unnecessary in
close corporations, where contractual arrangements and special charter and bylaw provisions can facilitate fair resolution of dissension, stalemates, deadlocks, and other problems
among shareholders. See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.04 (2d ed. 1971).
"7See
accompanying text at note 53, supra.
7
However, in that there is no substantive distinction between mergers and consolidations, it can be assumed that Gabhartapplies to the latter to the same extent that it applies to the former. See IND. CODE § 23-1-5-3 (1976).
"See note 39, supra, and accompanying text.
"IND. CODE § 23-1-5-8 (1976). This provision, added in 1967, can be used by a parent corporation which owns 95% of a subsidiary's shares. Minority shareholders are given appraisal rights, but are not entitled to vote on the merger. Deer and Burns, The 1967
Amendments to the Indiana GeneralCorporationAct 43 IND. L. J. 14, 29 (1967).
"See note 39, supra, and accompanying text.
"For example, a shareholder not entitled to vote on a short form merger, IND. CODE §
23-1-5-8 (1976), would be entitled to vote on a voluntary dissolution, IND. CODE § 23-1-7-1
(1976).
"But see Kemp v. Angel, - Del. Ch. -, 381 A.2d 241 (1977), in which the court found the
Singer v. Magnavox standard applicable to short-form mergers. See note 25, supra, and
accompanying text.
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registered on a national exchange.14 This exception did not apply in
Gabhart; however, because such registration would not by itself insure
arm's length bargaining, this exception should not alone preclude subjecting a transaction to the corporate purpose standard formulated in
Gabhart.
Due to the concern expressed in Gabhazrt for preserving minority interests and expectations, the case will undoubtedly chill the use of all
forms of the freeze-out in Indiana, not just mergers. However, a close
reading reveals only limited applicability. For example, it is reasonable to
assume that statutory provisions for sale of assets85 and voluntary
dissolution, 86 two other favorite freeze-out devices,87 contemplate
dealings with third parties in the disposal of corporate assets. If such
transactions took on freeze-out characteristics, without bargaining for
the disposal of assets, it would be appropriate to apply the corporate purpose standard. However, the statutory bases for other freeze-out devices,
such as reverse stock splits,88 are clearly intra-corporate transactions.8 9
Their validity would depend entirely on standards imposed by fiduciary
obligations. Gabhartis silent in regard to such obligations.
CONCLUSION

Gabhart holds that a merger which eliminates or reduces minority
equity and does not advance a corporate interest may be enjoined as a de
facto dissolution. The case does not stand for the proposition that majority shareholders can simply turn to the dissolution type of freeze-out to
accomplish their purposes because there is an express warning that
courts may intervene in freeze-out dissolutions on equitable grounds.
Although the circumstances that would validate a freeze-out merger are
not clearly articulated, the corporate purpose test would only seem to be
satisfied when no other reasonable alternative is available to majority
shareholders. Despite the expansive language used in the opinion, the
Gabhartrule is most applicable to the limited group of fundamental corporate changes that contemplate dealings with third parties at arm's
length bargaining.

8'IND. CODE § 23-1-5-7 (1976).

"5IND. CODE § 23-1-6-1 et seq. (1976).
"IND. CODE § 23-1-7-1 (1976).

"'See note 20, supra, and accompanying text.
8A reverse stock split could be accomplished by an amendment to the articles of incorporation. See IND. CODE § 23-1-4-1 et seq. (1976), IND. CODE § 23-1-4-4 (Burns Supp. 1978).
"For an example of the application of a freeze-out reverse stock split see Clark v. Pattern
Analysis & Recognition Corporation, 87 Misc.2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1976), in which
majority shareholders proposed a recapitalization plan that reduced outstanding shares on
a ratio of 4000 to one. No provision was made for fractional shares other than purchase.
The plaintiff minority, of course, owned less than 4000 shares. The court enjoined the plan
for lack of a "strong and compelling corporate business purpose". Contra, Teschner v.
Chicago Title & Trust Company, 59 Ill.2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974).
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So viewed, Gabhart establishes good law. Summary elimination of
fellow shareholders from participation in an ongoing enterprise is normally beyond the acceptable purposes of the use of corporate controlIf
shareholders desire this power they should provide for it interse from the
onset of the shareholder relationship. Otherwise the use of such power is
simply a demise of corporate norms that should not be made respectable
by reference to statutory provisions.
Moreover, the type of transaction that took place in Gabhartwould not
seem to be a natural response of the corporate community in the resolution of their problems. On the contrary, the deployment of such a transaction is more likely to be the response of over-zealous counsel.
Accordingly, business can continue under Gabhart.
RONALD B. GIVEN

